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Abstract
This.paper  explores  the  interactions  between  immigration,  iaequality  and  redistributive  6scal  policy
in  a  dynamic  general  equilibrium  model  in  which  government  policies  are  endogenously  determined
throqh  voting.  A  model  is  constructed  in  which  agents  rote  on  the  lerel  of  irnmi$ation  into  the
economy,  It  is shown  that  agents'  preferences  ove!  the  level  of imdgration  are  iniueuced  by  the  efiects
of immigiration  on factor  pdces.  Agents'  preferences  over  immigration  are shown  to  depend  non-trivially
on  the  characteristics  of immigrants  and  whether  they  will  receive  the  ftanchise  to  vote  in  the  future.  It
is shown  that  subtle  changes  in  the  distdbution  of  wealth  among  existing  citizens  can  have  a dramatic
impact  on the  equilibrium  behawior  of the  economy.
1  Introduction
In  this  paper,  lve study  several  general  equilibrium  models  in  which  agents  in  an  economy  must  decide on
the  appropriate  lwel  of  imnigration  into  the  country.  Residenis  or  citizens  of  an  economy  have identical
preferences  (i.e.,  utility  functiors)  over consumption  goods but  may  be endowed  with  different  amounts  of
capital.  This  alone  gives rise  to  altenlative  levels  of  desired  immigration.  In  a  simple  two-period  model
we show why  agents might  have 'polarized'  preferences over alternstive  levels of immigration-agents  prefer
either  the  maximum  or  minimum  lerel  of  immigration.  In  a  three-period  fta.ruework,  we  show  that  the
citizens'  preferences over  desired  lerels  of immigration  are in-fluenced by the  prospect  that  new  immigranis
will  be voting  in  the  future,  which  may  lead to  higher  taxation  to  finance  government  spending  from  which
they  will  benefit.  We also show that  the  distribution  of  initial  wealth  among  existing  residents  can have a
drarnatic  influence  oler  the  equilibrium  immigration  outcome,  Lastly,  these results  are contrasted  with  the
case in  which  new immigrants  are totally  disenfranchised  in  the  future.
Immigration  is  a controversial  topic  of  much  recent  discr.rssion in  many  couatries.  In  the  US  recently,
discussion has been directed to the issue  of whether new immiqants  &re'net  contributors'  to the economyor whether they .drain' resources  away from existing residents.r Presumably' if the latter is true there is less
reason for a country to op€n its doors to new immigrants'  Hovever, this is hardly  a new topic of concern'
Many European courtries  have fought for  decades  over the  issue of determining  the appropriate  level of
immigrant  workers-to admit into their  countries. Japan has-also  allowed a large number of'guest  workers'
to gain t€mporaxy employment in their  country.  Frrthermore,  it  is well known that  during the 1930s  us
irnmigration n/as  reduced to a tdckle, rcsulting in disaster for some  who were stranded in Europe.
The issue  here is uot just whether or not to admit immigrants to a country' or in what numbers, but also
,$hat  ski[s',  to admit to a cou]rtry. Not all potential iynrnig:ants  have the same  skills or hurnan capital, and
many cor.rntries  have the option of selecting the immigra.nts they wish to admit.  Existilg  citizeN  are likely
to be more inclined to permit  immigration  if these immigrants caJr  potentially  genelate positive economic
or:4ernalities. Presurnably som€one  without  any education or employment is less Iikely to genelate external
benefits for e:<isting  citizens than would someone  who has rare and valued skills.2  simila,rly, citizens with
high ter"els  of financial  capital might be more likely to generate these externalities if  they can be made to
invest in domestic capital.  Ilooever, it vould  appear that the ability  to geuerate  positil€  ext€rnalities would
not  be tbe  sole criterion  for  a potential  immigrant  gaining admittance into  the  countly.  In  alr economy
where the level of immigration  is determired by endogenous  political  consideratioqs, a potential irnmigrant
with  highly valued skills may not necessarily  gaiD admittance if his presmce is likely  to negatirely affect an
influential voting bloc within  the country. Since  any country would seem  to be able to adjust its immigration
policy so as to accept only the 'most desirable' immigra.nts, it is then of intelest to know what tlpe  of people
a country should.  be seeking,  and whether the er<isting  political  medianism wlll  permit  this immigratiou  to
take place.
Ca.nada  and the US axe an interesting contrast in this regard. Immigration  presently accounts for 40%
of the annual uS population gro.e!'th,  while beiug even more impoltant  in canada.  Immigration  into the us
seems  to be primarily  deterrnined by the unification  of family  rrembers, Plus the imPosition of quotas for
prospective immigrants from rerious geographical  areas. By contrast, the Canadian gwernment has for some
time  ofiered citizenship to foreigners who could meet a certain capital requirement.  The point  beircg  here
that  someone  who could meet these standards would be more likely to promote iN€stment  within  Canada
and less likely to need government-provided social bmefits.3  h  this vtay, canada seeqrs  somewhat u.nique,
rSee,  for  exa.mple,  Borjas  {2] and  the  references  therein.
2Unless,  of  coume, you  are an  existing  citizen  with  tho-r€ sane  skills-e.g-,  consider  the  iInPaEt  on  US  and  other  Western
mathematicians  of the  influx  of mathematicians  from  forme!-Soviet  states'
3This  badly  seems  like  a fool-prcof  strategy  since  it  would  appear  that  there  are  many  wavs  that  one  could  foil  the  intent
of this  requirerD€nt,  for  example,  by shiPPing capital  ofishore once the  individual  obtain6  residence'
N€vertheless  the  chanSe  in  immigration  policy  for  canada  is  visibly  aPParent  to  anyone  walking  the  stleets  of  cities  such  as
Van€ouv€r  or  Toronto.  Untile  196?, 99% of all  Canadian  immigrants  vr€re of EuroPean  origin.  How€v€r,  by the  year 2000 it  is
exDected that  18% of all  Canadians  will  be  'visible  minorities''since most immigration  a,round  the world appears to take the form of individuals with  low levels of human
capital departing for another country. There is a plethora of examples to illustrate  this:  workers move from
T\rrkey to Germany, Korea to Japan, Me>dco  to the US, and from many couniries to South Africa.  In ma.ny
of these  cases,  these guest workerc have  los' levels of human capital and are a major source  of hard currency
for the poorer countries ftom which they emigrate.
At  times in Ca^nada  it  seems  that  it  is the rule that  the migrants have high levels of capital.  Vancouver
has been the benefi.ciary  of a substantial increase  in real estate prices, and it  is thought  that  this has been
fueled by Asian nationals, particula.rly ftom  Hong Kong,  fleeing their  home with  capital  and buying  up
property- tr\rthermore  it would be quite feasible to gear immigration  policy so as to target to norkers with
a particula.r type of human capital, such as engineers  or mathematicians.  We e:(plore this issue below by
analyzing the impact of having a pool of potential immigrants who have  comparatively high lercls of capital.
These economic axgumetrts  often stray hto  cultural  territory  as well.  In  Fla.nce, it  appea.rs  to  be a
constant concern to some citizens that  new immigrants will  alter  the domestic language, institutions  and
culture, as r ,€ll as procure ecouomic  beuefits ftom the government. This is one of the reasons  why the more
consewative  perties in Flance, who are not in favor of increased  immigration,  have been the beneficiaries  of
a resrlgence in popularity.
There are many interesting immigration  case studies around the world.  Japa.n  and Korea essmiially
prohibit  the  entrance of unskilled workers.  On the  other  hand,  Singapore, Thailand  and Malalsia  rely
heavily on foreign workers-  Thailand  has half  a million  citizens working  abroad, while  having between
500,ff)0 and 900,000  foreign workers in the country.  Malaysia is a fascinating ocample, with  between one
and two million  foreign workers in  a labor  force of  8 million.  It  has been attracting  la,rge quwrtities  of
foreign investment, which has help to generate a labor shortage wbich can only be remedied by importing
foreign workers. Consequently,  the grodh  in GNP has been between 8% and 9% in recent years. 70% of
construction jobs and 30% of agriculture and forestry jobs are occupied by foreign workers.a
The intent  of this paper is to shed some light  on t!r,e  ecanonric  factors which may influence the voting
patterns of domestic citizens on the issue  of immigration.  Additionally,  the dynarnic aspects  to this question
will be emphasized,  since  this would appear  to be a question with some  serious  dl.namic implications. Altering
the immigration  policy in one period will  influence the quantity  of the factors of production,  factor prices
and the distribution  of wealth iu future periods. If agents are forwa.rdlooking, then they should ta.ke  these
future  consequences  into  account when formulating  preferences  over the number of immigrants to  admit
today.
There is some  recent work that  is relaied to the approach adopted below- Benhabib [1] studies a simple
model in which agents' rnotives are determined by purely economic  considerations  over alternative economic
4see  Ma  ir  [6]  for  an  excellent  summary  of  the  flows  of  workers  around  the  world.policies, though the analysis does not contain many of the details studied in the model below- Cukierman,
Hercon'itz and Pines {3] also study irnmigration,  but  they look at an environment in  which the potential
migrants must make optimal  decisions in considering whether to or not  to move. Neither of these pape,rs
considers  the potential effect, over several  periods, on the quantities of both eapitsl and labor, together with
the charges in their factor prices, that result from the endogenous  determination of the level of immigration.
The remaiader of this  paper is orga.nized  as follows.  In  the uext  section, we analyze a simple twe
period economy in which agents have an endon'rnmt and must saw from one period to the ner<t. Agents
subsequently  receive  capital and labor income. The agents must 1'ote  on the number of immigrants to admit
and are cogniza.nt  of all  the general equilibrium  effects of this  potential  charge in  the labor  force.  This
gives rise to an indirect  utility  firnction for each agent over the number of immigrants to admit,  and those
preferences  can be pararnetrized by an individual's  initia.l capital holding- We show that  if there is no upper
bound on the number of potential ir  nigranis, then all agents  would prefer to drive the number of irnsrigra,nts
to inffnity.  If  there is some  maximum number of potential  immigrants, thm  residents are 'polarized'  wiih
respect  to immigration--each  resident's most prefened poiut on the issue  spare is either zero  or the maximum
a.llowable  number of immigrafis,  with  the initially  capital-poor preferring zero and the initially  capital-rich
preferring the maximum- There is a critical  level of capital at which an agent is indifferent between the two
polesl consequently,  the majority-.r'oting outcome depends  on whether the median le'r'el  of capital  is above
or below this critical  point-  Within  the context of a particular  family of distributions of initial  capital-the
Pareio family-we  show  that there is a monotonic relationship betweeu  the degree  of initial  wealth inequality
in th€ society ard  the majority-voting  winner.  Zero immigration  prewails  high levels  of inequality, while the
maximum allowable prevails at low levels of inequality.
In section 3 we briefly examine a variant of the original model in which residents  must pay a direct cost if
a giren number of immigrants are to be admitted.  The cost might be interpreted as a sort of direct disutility
from irnmigration or simply as a tax which residents must pay to mver the costs of admitting  new citizms.
We shorn'  that, depending on the structure of the cost fr.rnctiou,  residents' indir€ct utilities  over immigration
may be singl+.peaked  in the level of immigration  with  a finite  'most-preferred' point.
In section 4 we entend the original  model to three pe  ods.  Domestic residents a,re  assumed  to receive
capital and labor income in  the second period,  but  only  capital  income and government transfers in  the
third.  In the benchma.rk  case  potential  immigrants have no capital in the second  period, but  can work to
generate labor income.  The immigration  decisiou must be made in  the first  period, but  in  the following
period agents must vote on the level of income tax that  will  be used to finance luml>sum trarsfers  to all
agelts. Not surprisinglS poorer agents  wil] then faror higher rates of taxation and tra.nsfers,  There are many
interesting dynamic interactions that  can arise. For er<ample,  if new immigrants are subeequently  given the
franchise to vote, then domestic residents must taL€ this into account when formulating  their  desired levelof immigration.  This is likely to curtail the desired level of immigration.  In contrast, if these immigranis are
not Eia€n the right  to vote, then domestic residents who own plenty of capital caJl expect to bmefit  from
having these laborers in the economy. We analyze the factors determining the residents' desired levels in
detail and conduct some  .rr_  merical ec<per  ments to e:<amine  the relationship between  properties of the initial
distribution  of wealth in the economy and the existence and nature of majority-voting  outcomes over the
issue of immigration.
2  A two-period  model with  only  pecuniary  efiects
Initially,  we consider ar  economy which lasts for  two periods,  It  is assumed that  there is a.rr  unlimited
supply of potential immigra^nt,  relative to the initial  size  of the economy  under consideration. Immigrants, if
admitted, arrive in the second  period, urithout capital, and sim-ply  consume  income from the inelastic supply
of labor.  Consequently the only non trivial  decision problem is that  faced by residents. Each resideat is
endowed  stith some  anount  of capital in the first Ileriod, whidr  the resideat divides lnto consumption in the
fust period and savings  for the second  period. In the second  period, the resideat consumes  his or her income
ftom savings  and income ftom labor services  which the resident supplies  inelastically. The labor endowments
of all agents, both residents and irnmigra.nts,  are normalized to one.
For computational purposes,  w€ assume  that  a resident's utility  over consumption in the two periods is
described by the timesepa.rable, logarithmic utility  function
u (c1,c2) = log (cl)  + B log (c2) '
All  resldents  have the  ssne  preferences  over the  two  consumption  goods.  A  residmt  mdowed  initially  with




where s denotes savings,  r, is the wage rate in period two and r  is the rental rate on capital.
Production, which takes place only in the second  period, is undertaken by competitive fums with  access
to a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production  teclnology,  using capital  (aggregate savings) and
labor as inputs-
F(K'L):  AKdLt-d.
If r  denotes  the rental rate on capital, and u, the wage  rate, in equilibrium we will have  r  :  \(K,L)  :
aA(K lL)"-1 and,w: Fz(K,L):  (r - c) (r/r)".Irrunigration policy is decided  on in the first period, prior to the residents' consumption-savings  decision-
To describe  the political  equilibrium, we use the standard model of twopa.rty  competition over a single issue,
where the issue  here is the nurnber of immigrants to admit.  Initially,  we take the issue  space  to be Ra-i.e.,
we assume an unlimited  supply of potential  immigrants.  Later  we.will  consider the case where the issue
spacc is a closed  interval from zero to some  maximum number of immiSrants.
Even though residents have identical preferences  over consumption goods, if  they ditrer in tfteir  iuitial
holdings of capital  they will  ia  general not  have identical prefermces over the nunber  of immi$a.trts to
admit.  Let p denote the distribution  of initial  ca.pital holdings in the r€sident population with  support over
some set /C c  -R1. The size of the resident population is normalized to one, so that  Irc p@k)  :  t.
In order to describe  residents)  induced preferences  over immigration,  fix some  number of immigants,  N-
Given N, we can calculate the general  equilibrium for the economy,  solving for prices, aggregate  savings  ardt
ultimatd  residents' utility  lerels, as functions of N.
A resident who begirs with  initiat  capital k-agent  /c  for short-<hooses savings s so as to maximize
loe  (b -  s) f  B  log  [rs + tr-r]
gi.r'en  ft and the prices r  and trl. The prices of course depeud on the aggregate  state of the economy,  which
here will  consist of aggregate period-two capital,  which we denote b,y K,  and the  Dumber of imuigrants
admitted,  .lL  The solution to this problem is
s(k;u/r):  -!  ^r  -
t+p
which gives rise to the indirect utility  function
71u
l'lBr
u  (k;w'r):lnlk - s(k;wlr)l  +dln[rs(h;u/r)  +u-,]
: r + (t  +B)  los  lt +  :l  +  0toshl,
where  y :  Elos@) -  (t + l3)  log  (r + E).5
If  the number of immigrants is N,  aggregate  labor supply in  the second period is I  :  1 *  N.
aggregate  period-two capital equal to K,  the prices r  aud u, thm  satisfy
w:Fz(K,r+N):(1 -a)Af  K  \"
\1 + N-/
,  --  \  a_l




so that  the wage-rental ratio is 
u  _  I _ a  K
r  d  l+lf 
'
sNote  that  we  have  not  impcsed  alry  nonnegativity  conEtraint  on  residents'  savings;  cons€quently,  in  equilibrium,  some
residents  may  be  borrowing  from  other  residents.  This  could  be  modified  without  substantitively  altering  our  results,  but  at
the  cost of much  less cla  ty.
(1)
(2)
Gir"enIn equifibrium,  aggregate  period-two  capital,  K, and  the individual  savings  decisions  ' {s (k;u  lr) : k e K},
must satisfy
K:  I  s  (kiw  /r) p (d.k)
JK
0  l  .  ""  1  ur : 
taB  1**t"to*) 
- 
*B;'
where  we  have  used  (1)  and  the  fact  that [rp@k)  =1.  Subetituting  [(t-o)/a]  [K/ (1  +N)]  forwfr,and
rearranging, gives
eB
::t;,;i;fi  :i  i  E, K: c(1  +0)+(t-")#r




-\.'/-  a(l+B)(1  +N) +1- a'
sothattofr:  O(N)E. Notethat  iD  (N) is  strictly  decreasing  in N for,V > 0with@(0) :(t-a)B/(+aB)
andO(+oo):0.
Giren this notation, the equilibrium  rental rate on capital can be e<pressed  in terms  of O (Ar)  E by
./  I(  \"-l
r:oAl;_-:_l
\r  f  rY  /




: a" (1  - a;r-' a [o  1r; r]"-r .
The indirect utility function of a resident  with initial capital k ftom equation  (2) can  then be tritten  as
y (JV;k)  : s6lsisni  + (1  +B)los[k+o(N)E] -B(1 - o)  bs [o  (N)  E]  .
For  computational  purposes,  it  convenient  to  distinguish  agents  by  the  relative  capital  holdings-precisely,
by  the  ratio  of  agents'  iuitial  capital  holdings  to  the  mean  initial  capital  holding.e  Let  r  :  k/ft.  We can
a,rrd  the  equilibrium  wage.rental  ratio  by
a:
r
For  compactness,  let
6Alternatively,  one can view  this  tra.nsformation  as a rescaling  of the  units  in  which  initial  capital  is measured  so that  the
mean initial  bolding  is one.  Below,  in anallzing  the ihre€,.pedod  modet,  we will  make a similar  traDsformation  ofagpnts'  utilities
from  period  two  onward.  In  thai  case,  the  interpletation  as  a change  of  units  is  no  longer  arailable,  sinc€  period-two  a!€mge
income  will  depend  on  the  ler.el  of  immigration  and  we clearly  cannot  choos€  units  so that  average  period-two  income  is one  for
all  possible levels of immigration.
a(1  +B)  (1  +N)+1-0then write a typical resident's  indirect utility function as
V (N;x):  constart  + (1  + B)  Ios  k + <D  (/v) - B  (r - o)  log  lo (N)l  ,
where  the  consta.nt.  term  is gi'!€n  by z * B  log  (""  1r  - 
"1t-' 
a) + (1+ oB)  log  (E).
It  is straightforwa.rd to  show that  V(N;r)  is,  for  a  small,  not  globally  concave in  N,  and,  in  any
case, does not  attain  a maximum  on  {N  : N  > 0}.  This  is clear, since O (N)  converges  to  zero as N
goes  to infinity;  consequently,  the (1 + B) los [r + A (N)]  term in  (3) mnverges to  (1 + B) log (c)'  while the
-p  (t -  a) tog  [O  (N)] term goes  to +oo.
One can actually say more, girren  the functional forms r"e have assumed.  In pa.rticula.r,  given c, V (N;o)
is strictly  increasing or strictly  decreasing  in N  as
N  rTtoa^
Q+dp
N  .Lroa=  f1  - t).
a+oP  \J  l
Thus, for the relatively  wealthy-residents  with  relatire  capital holdings r  2  1-v  (N; o)  is increasing in
N  or.er  all of {N:  N > 0}.  This is because  the immigration of new workers  raises  the ma.rginal  prod-
uct of capital.  For the relatively poor, those  with  r  (  1, iz(N;z)  is decreasing  from N  :  0 to N  :
l(t +  o,P)  / (a+  a/)l  [(t/")  -  l]  and increasing  therea,fter.  Presumably  this is because  the new immigrants
lower the wage of exiting  workers, though the increase in the ralue of residents' capital  that  results from
immigration eventually outweighs this negatire effect on poorer residents' labor income. If the issue  space  is
taken to be {N:  N  > 0},  there is clea,rly  no majority-rule  equilibrium  outcome-for  any potmtial  number
of fuunigrants N,  there is always an lt  > N *hi.h  more tha.rr  half the resident population preferc to N-
If, on the other hand, there is an upper bowrd .& on the number of potential immigrants, then one can
show that  each resident's indirect  utility  is maximized oer  [0,  -&] at one of the two endpoints depending
on the  individual's  relative  capital  holding  o.  For  r  zufficie.ntly small,  N  :  0 is preferred' while  for  r
sufficiently la.rge,  N :  N  is preferred. Cleally, the relatirely  wealthy all prefer N to any level of imrnigration
N € 10,  iV] since  V (N;c)  is increasing  in N on [0,  N]  when r ]  1. For the relatia€ly  poor, those  residents
with c < l, the indirect utility function v(N;o)  is u-shaped  on {N:  N > 0}, and hence  is either u-shaped
or simply decreasing  and convex  on [0, .Vl depenaing on l{  and the individual's relative wealth. For standard
parameter ralues, there is a value of r,  call it  o (.ait), such that  if c  <  :r ('tr)  then agent c strictly  prefers
N  :  0 to  any other  N  €  [0, iV] , while  if  r; >  r  (N),  t  prefers  N  :  N.?  Thrls,  the  voting  outcome  hinges on
whether the media.n voter's relative  capital  holding  is aboye or below r  (F).  It  ttre median relative  initial
TThe  critical  !-alue,wbichisdefinedbyv(0;c)=v(N;').isc(l)= 
lo  tof  "  o (n)'-"  - * (o)]  / [r 
- 
[+  (0)  /+ (iV)]'1,
where  ?:  B  (1  -o)/(1+B).
(3)
(:-,capital holding is below r  (-&), a majority  of residents then have relatia€ capital holdings below the critical
wlue  c (N),  and so a majority  of residents prefer lf  :  0 to  any alternative  in  [0, iV].  Conversely,  if  the
median ralue of relatire  w€alth is greater than r  (iV),  then a majority  of resid.mts prefer N  =  rT to  any
alternative, making maximal immigration  a majority-rule  outcome.
Figure 1 illustrates the ralue frrnction (3) for various ralues of r.  Here we set B :  1 and a :  .30. clea,rly'
the  retatively poor  agents prefer zero immigration,  while  the  relatively  rich wa,rrt to  have the maximum
quantity.  The primary  soruce of income for the rich is capital  income, and therefore they nrant to  hal€
more workers in  order to raise the marginal product  of capital.  The very poor, who derive most of their
income from labor,  are in  the  opposite situation-they  would  prefer fewer workers in  order to  raise the
marginal product of labor-  For intermediate ralues of r,  preferences  a.re  not single.peaked but  are, rather,
'single-caved'.8
Not to put too much stress on this exarnple, but  one can readily imagine distributions  of initial  capital
where the media.n  value of z  :  k/E  falls as income inequality  rises.e We can thm  have situations v/here
the majority-favored  policy swings from one extreme to the other if  inequality  is increasing or decreasing
over time-,that  is, it  is possible to imagine a situation  where an economy like this  one may have in  the
past adopted a closed-border policy, N  :  0, but  in which inequality  is falling  and r-,  the ratio  of k"'  to
[,  rising.  Evmtuel]y,  if  inequality  decreases  suftciently,  the  economy may pass the treshhold where the
majority-favored policy switches to lf  :  N, and borders are opened  to the maximum arailable irnmigration.
One might  even imagine cycles in  immigration  in  which the  influx  of immigra.nts reverses  the decline in
inequality, and policy eventually swings back to N :  0.
It  is also worth pointinB out that,  giren the other parameters of the model, the larger is the maximum
lerel of immigration  N,  the more likely is it  that  F  wil  be the majority-rule  outcome. Put  differently, in a
choice of N  €  [0, iV], while a rnajority  of residents might prefer zero immigration  to a small '&, a majoriiy
may also prefer a larger N  to zero. TNs is straightforward, since the ftaction of residents preferring N :  N
to /{  :  0-call  ii  /  (.V)-is  simply
/ (iV):r {r: k/[ >  c  (iV)]
: p  {k I  a  (fr;k/E)  > ?  (o;  k/E)},
and u (N;e/F)  is inmeasing  in N for N suficiently large.
ssee  Sen [4. This result is also  consistent  with the findings of Benhabib [1], who studies  a diff€rent model.
eThe median value of c is simply  the median .,alue of ft, divided  by the  mean, E.  A decline in  the  ratio  of median to  mean
of the iniiiat  wealth distribution  would  be ta&en by some to be synonymous  with  arl increase in inequalitv.3  A model with  additional  direct  costs of immigration
The simple example with  only pecuniary efiects has the unfortunate  feature of N  :  +co  being the favored
choice  if no upper bound is placed on the number of potential immigrants.  However,  it is possible  to slightly
alter this environment so as to obtain prefereuces  which have single peaks at finite !"alues  of N.  Suppose  that
there is an immigration  cost that  must be borne by e>dsting  residents in a per capita fashion. In paxticular
suppose  that  if N  immigrants are admitted,  then an agent $'ith  initial  wealth k faces  the followiag budget
constraint in the first-period:
k-g(N)E:cr*st
where g is some  nonnegative,  increasing, convex function-  The multiptication  ofg  (N)  by I  here is useful for
maintaining the scale-invariance  features of the previous model, but is otherwise inessential.
Because  the direct cost of immigration  enters a resident's utility-maximization  problem as a sort of 'shift'
of the resident's initial  wealth, the axguments  of the last section, which established the form of residents'
irdlect  utilities  over N, go through without  modification erccept  for the substitution  of k -  9 (N) [  for k. In
particula.r, we hare
V  (N;r) : senslanl  + (1  +p)loc[c-e(N)+a(N)]  - B  (t - a)  log  [o  (N)]
as the iudirect  utility  function or"er  N  for an resident whose initial  capital relative to the rneal  is z.  With
enough convexity in the fr.rnction  9 (N),  y  (N;r)  becomes  coucave  in -l{.1o
Consider  the following  specification:  s(N)  = .0f6N2- With  this introduction of this direct cost,  Figure
? illustrates  the indirect  utility  function  for  pa.rameters  identical to  those used to generate Figure 1.  As
can be seen,  the indirect utility  function is now concave,  and interior  maxima ca,n  be found for some  values
of r.  Figure 3 illustrates the dependence  of the indlect  uiility  furction,  including  the immi$ation  cost
9 (N),  on the discount factor B-11 The two er<a.mples  presmted are for B =  1 and f  :  1.2, for a value of
r:1.  Of course,  the'peak' in the indirect utility funciion corresponds  to agent  ,'s most preferred  level  of
irnmigration  and, as the examples  show, this prefened level increases  with  p.  The resuli is intuitive-the
higher an individual's  discount factor, the more the individual  wishes to invest, hence the more important
is the rate of retwn  io capital. The most obvious way to increase  the rate of return  to capita.l  is to increase
the labor force, since this will  raise capital's marginal product.
It  is also of interest to see  how modifications to the production  technolory can a.lter the desired level of
immigration. Figure  4 illustrates  two such  (scaled)  indirect utility firnctions  for a:.30  and a:.35,  while
holding constant B:  I and r:  1. Increasing a corresponds  to increasing the retun  to capital by makiug it
roone  *'ay  to  think  of this cost is as a lump-sum  tax  levied on citizens  to finance  immigration  costs.  Ofcourse,  it  is assumed
that  agents  with  the  lowest  wealth  can  aflord  to  pay  this  tax.
rlThese  are scal€d by  a constant  to  facilitate  .]}mparison.
10more important  in the production technologir. Consequently,  existing citizens find the return  to investment
to be higher and more important  in solving their  optimization  problem.  Therefore, they will  want to have
more immigration-
In subsequmt sections,  economies  will  be studied in which the preferences.  of agents are not  necessarily
concave  or single.peaked  in the level of imrrigration.  These  economies  are enlightening because  they illustrate
the economic  interactions st play; moreover,  we can in many cases  show thet majority-rule  immigration  levels
exist even  ebsmt singl+.peakedness.  Nevertheless,  if this should bother the reader, the introduction  of conler<
immigration  costs can, as is illustrated  with  the examples  of Figures 2-4, help produce concavity.
4  A  three-period  model  with  redistributive  taxation
In  this  section, we consider a model where immigrants,  having arrived,  r,ote together with  residents orer
redistributive  fiscal policy- To the extent that  immigrants arrive poorer, on average,  than natives, they may
favor a policy of high taxes and large transfers. The effects of such policies on nativ€s may serve to temper
the preference  for unbounded immigration  which manifested itself in the previous section.
Precisely,  we aupmt  the model of the previous the section ir  the following way. Residents  live for tbree
periods and are each endowed  with  some initial  holding of capital.  In  the first period, as before, residents
vote o1€r the number of immigrants  to admit,  then make a corsumption-savings decision.  In  the second
period, immigra,nts a,rrire, and are assumed  to be endowed  with  labor only.  The second-period income of
residents consists of income from labor  and first-period  savings; the income of inmigrants  is solely from
labor.  All  citizens-residents  aud irnuigrants-make  a second  consumptiotr-savings  decision in period tuo-
Savings  ftom period two to period three earn a fxed  rate of return,  ft,  a.nd  ilcome  ftom savings  is taxed at
a constant rate 0.  Income in period three, which is also equal to consumption in period three, consists of
after-tan savings income plus a luml>sum transfer which is identical for all agents. The fisca.l  policy to be
enacted  in period three-which  can be reduced, through government budget balance a.nd  general equilibrium
considerations, to a one-dimensional choice of tax rate-is  roted  on by the entire population in period two
prior to the consumption-savings  decision.
Residents are again assumed  to have identical preferences  over consumptiotr in the three periods, with
utility  taking the time-additive logarithmic  form
tn  (cr)  + Bh (cz)  + B2ln  (ca)  .





(1  -0)Rs: +r:ca,
where (l  -  d)R  is the after-tax retun  to savings  in period three and r  is the lumpsump  transfer payment.
As before, the returns  to  savings and labor in  period two,  tu and r,  will  be given in  equilibrium  by the
maxginal products of capital and labor, and will  depend on the capital-labor ratio in period two. We assume
the retun  to savings  in period three, R, is a consta.nt.12
An immigrant has preferences  wer  consumption in periods two and three given by
tn  (c2)  + Bln (cs)
and faces  the pair of budget constraints
a.nd
w:c2+s3
(1  - 0).Rss+r: c..
The lumpsum  transfer in  period three, r,  is identical across agents and is financed ftom  tax  revenue
collected on savings  income in period ihree. The government is assumed  to have a bala.nced  budget, so that
if 53 denotes average  savings  brought into period three, the transfer palment is given by
r  :  0R83,.
Giren  the sequence of economic  and political  decisiorx  described  above, the politico-e  conomic  equilibriun
for  this  economy  ca.n be  solved  using  backwa.r'd induction.  In  particular,  gil€n  a  distribution  of  citizens'
income  at  the  start  of period  two,  we can solve for  the  equilibrium  level of savings  for  period  three  and  the
transfer  payment  as a function  ofthe  iax  rate  9.  This  induces,  for each agent, an indirect  utility  firnction  for
the  last  two  periods  as a firnction  of  0 and  the  agent's  level  of  income  at  the  siafi  of  period  two.  We show
that  for  each level of period-two  income,  ihis  uiility  function  is single-peaked  in 0 and apply  the media.n voter
theorem  to  obtain  the  majority-rule  period-three  tax  rate  as a function  of  the  median  lerel  of  period-two
income.  Corsequently,  each agent's  utility  from  period  two  on can be summarized  as a function  of his or her
period-two  income  and  the  media.n level of period-two  income-
We then  step back  to  period  one.  For a given  level of immigration  N,  we can sohe  each resident  agent's
period-one  consumption-savings  problem,  where  utility  ftom  period  two  onward  is  giwn  by  the  indirect
utility  function  described  in  the  previous  paragraph.  We assume that  individuals  act  taking  as given  the
med.ian level  of  income  in  period-two  and  assume rational  ercpectations  in  the  sense that)  in  equilibrium'
12ln other,  words,  the  production  technology  in period  three  is simply  F (rf)  =.RK,  Alternatively,  it  could  be a.ssumed that
labor  is a factor  of  production  in this  period  as w€ll-  This  would  reduce  the  tractability  of the  formulation,  r,/ithout  having  a
substantial  impa.t  on ihe  results.
72the expected and actual media,n  values of period-two income coincide. As before, equilibrium  in the capital
market determines aggregate  period-two capital, the capital-labor  ratio  and retuflE  to capital and labor as
functions of l{.  As a consequence,  each  resident's lifetime utility  can be reduced to a function of ,l{ ard  the
agent's initial  holding ofcapital.  Finally, we can then cha,racterize  the majority-rule  level of N chosen  in the
initial  period.
The next section examines  the subgame  stafiing  in period tn'o, given a distribution  of incone at the sta.rt
of the period. We cha.racterize  the equilibrium  tax rate in terms of the median level of period-two income,
and derive an expression  for each sgent's utility  in terms of the median level of income and the agent's own
lncome.
4.1  The  problem  from  period-two  on
Consider  a.u agent----either  a native  or  imrnigrant-who  begins  period  two  with  i:rcome  equal  to  g-  Givm
values for  the  tax  rate  0 and  transfer  pal'rnent  r,  the  problem  faced by  such an agent  is
max  {ln (g  -  s)  + Bln [(1  -  d)  ns + r]] .
The  first-order  coqdition  for  this  problem  is
B0-0)R
,-s:G:Ons+?'
so that  the optimal choice  of savings  is given by
"_ 
p 
",_ -  7+A"
Consumption  in  the  two  periods  is then  given  by
(1  -a)"8(1  +B)'
and
Given d and z, let s (9;r, d)
i:quilibrium  satisfies
c2:Y - s
:  I  [,,*  '  I
r+pL"  (1  -a)^Rl
ca: (1  - 0),Rs*r
:1fio-etnp+6+*-]
denote  savings  of  ar  agent  with  income  y.  Then,  the
0El s  (y;  r,0)  u  (ds)




transfer  payment  in
l3where  r  (dy)  is the  distribution  of agents according  to income  lerels,  and  M  is the  total  measure of agents.r3
Plugging  in  s (g; r, d) gives
' :'# | lh'  -6-?#1  +D]  /(d?)
:r"rfii-F#*
where  t = Iu"@a)/U  is average  period-two  income.  Then
Remembering  the  expressions for  individuals'  coDsumption---€quations  (4) and  (5)-note  that
rep
n:oE  =(-arTd;ea'




Combining  (6)  with  (a)  and  (5),  individual  g's  consumption  in  the  two  periods  can be expressed as
L  l(t+ilv+oA(r-a)1 cz=ITVL-  r+E_l|-l
and
",:1fio-,)"lst+{igFel
Then, individual  g's indirect utility  funciion-maximized  utility  as a function of 9, t,  A and other pa.rameters
has the form
u  (y,!,0)  : q  +  (L  * a"lg!+#y#fl  *  r' t,  -  rr,
where  theconstant term is 4 = U (6)+OU  (r*Z)*OLotn).  As in the tweperiod model  of the previous
section, it  is conenient  to express  a.n  agent's indirect  utility  in terms of his or her income relatire  to the
mean level of neriod-two income- Let
(6)
(7)
so that  a.n  agent's indirect utility  function csn be written  as
v(y,!,0):q+  (1  +Oln(t)  +u(0;ah).
13If JV immigrants  ha.,e b€€n admitred  in period  one, then  M  :  1 +  N.
14lVhile the term (l  + B) log (y-) will  come into play when we step back to consider the irnnigration  decision
in period one, for the purpos€ri  of characterizing the politicceconomic  equilibrium  tax rate in period three
it  may be sa.fely  ignored. For the remainder of the section, we focus on tr (0;9/y-)'
I€t  z stand for. an individual's  income relative to the mear in period two-i,  e., z =  y/f.  Consider the
problem of maximizng  u (0;z)  with  respect to d, subject to the constraint 0 < A < 1- The constraint d (  I
will  not be binding, of course, as tu (1; z) :  -oo,  and w (0; z) > -oo  is attainable for I  <  1. The constraint
d >  0 will  be binding, however, for  individuals  with  z 2  l.  It's  easy to  show that  fot z 2  7, u(?iz)  is
nsximized  at d = 0. To see  this, note that  w (0; z) can be written  as
w  (0;  z)  :  (1  + p)  ln  [(l  + B)  z  + 0  B  (r  - z)]  + [0ln  (1  - d)  - (1  + B)  ln  (t + P  - s  B\, (8)
and, for z >  l,  the first  term is decreasing  in  0----strictly so, if z )  1.  The second,  bracketed term is also
decreasing  in  d over the interval  [0,1] for any f  >  0.  In  sum, for any individual  with  period-two ircome
$eater  than the arerage lwel  of period-two income, the agmt's  indtect  utility  firnction  ov€r tax  rates is
trivially siugle-peaked,  a.nd  0:0  is the agent's  most preferred  ta:<  rate.
When z (  f,w(0;z)  is increasing  in 0 at d:0,  so  neither  the constraint  ofd < I nor 0 2 0 are  binding.
One can show thst ta (d; z) is strictly  mncare in d on [0, 1] and attains a u.nique  maximum at sorne  0 e (0, 1).
Concavity is most e.asily  seen by considering the last expression for u(O;z),  equation (8).  Differentiation
reveals  the second,  bracketed  term is stdctly  concave  in d, while the ln [(1 + fi  z + 09 0  -  z)] term is concave
as the composition of concave  fimctions.
For the z < 1 case.  tedious alsebrala shows  that  the fiEt-order  condition for arl interior solution to
ma-x{ra(0;z):0  < d  < 1}
reduces  to the following quadratic equation in 0:
p2  (t - z)  02  - G  + hll + 2p  (1  - z)10  +(1  +B)'?  (1  - z)  : 0.
The appropriate solution to this quadratic equation-the  root between zero and one-is
t"'"':rytn'o<'-*iqM
The  firnction  0'  (z)  thus  gives the  most-preferred  tax  rate  for  individuals  whose period-two  income  is less
than  the  awrage  lerel  of period-two  income  acro,ss  all  agents.
Some properties of  0* (z)  are worth  noting.  First,  d- (z)  is decreasing in  z:  the  relatively  poorer  is
an  agent, the  higher  is his or  her  preferred tax  rate  (a:rd transfer)-  Also,  lim,-r  d. (z)  :  0,  so there
is no  discontinuity  io  the  preferred  tax  rates  as we  move  from  the  relatively  $/ealthy-those  agents  with
laSee the appendix.
1i)z >  1, whose preferred tax  rate is zero-to  the relatiltly  poor.  While  d* (z) varies monotonically with  z,
it's  dependence  on the time.preference pararneter p is more complex.  Finally,  as is shown in  Dolmas and




1)  (u,  t,  e  (a^  /  iD :rr + (1  +  f) ln  I  Q  +  il Y  ! 0  (y^^  l  t)  P@  - dl +  f rn  [r  - e  @"*  /  r)]
I  r+B-e(a-/r)B l
=w  (v;a^,u)  '
(e)
Theu, g (z) is the preferred tax rate an individual who begins period two with income g such that 3r/g :  2 fq1
any z )  0. Since  each  individual's  preferences  over the tax rate a.re  single-peaked,  the median voter theorem
applies, and the majority-nle  tax rate in period three will be given by I (z-),  where z-  is the median walue
of relative income in p€dod-two-i.  e., z^:  A^/r-  If  z-  )  1--*o  that  the median voter has income higher
than the mean-then  the majority-  le tax rate is zero; otherwise, it  is given by 0'(z-)'
Givm  our solutions for each iadividual's  preferred ta:<  rate, for any distributiou  of income at the start
of period two w€ ca;1  calculate the median level of income, the mean level of income and the corresponding
majority-rule  tax rate. The utility  which each  agent receives  ftom period two ouru,rd can then be sumrnarized
in terrrs of three lariables-the  agent's o$Tr  pe  od-two income, the media.n  level of period-two income a.nd
the mean lerel of period-two income- Using (7), when the tax-rate  in period three is set according to the
prefereuces  of the median vot er-i-e-,  0 = 0 (g^/t)-the  utility  from period two on of an agent who begius
period two with  income g is
(10)
Notethatwithy:u,W(u;g^'g)alsogil'estheutilityfromperiodtwoonwardofanimmigrantwho
arrives with  only an endov'rment  of labor services  to supply.
4.2  Back to the initial  period
We now step back to period one.  An  agent's income g in period two comea  potentially  from two sources,
capitalincomeandLaborincome-thatba:.oru:rs*u,dependingonwhethertheagentisan
immigrart  or resident and, if the latter,  whether the resideut engaged  in a Pciti!€  amount of saviags in the
first period.  The problem we nox' turn  to consider is the decision problem faced by a resident at the staxt
of ihe 6rst period.
Taking as given prices, the amount of immigation  and.  the period-two income distribution,  a resident
with  capital h in period one chooses  savings s to maximize his or her lifetime utility,  given by
In  (e  - s) + BI4l  (rs  + It);a^,a)  . (11)As before, in  equilibrium,  the  fsctor  prices ru and r  will  be functions of the  ratio  of  aggregate period-
tno  capital to aggregate  labor, 1*  N.  Givm  the loga.rithmic form of the agent's first-period  utility  arrd the
indirect utility  firnction I4l, it's possible  to derive s(act decision  rules conditional on the level of immigration,
N,  aggregate capital, K,  and the median and mea.n  of the period-two income distribution,  v'n a,rrd  t-  In
a rational  ocpectations equilibriurn  it  must be the  case that  individual  decisions are consistent with  the
aggregates  K,  g,n atrLd.  A.
Our  solution procedure is as follows.  For each level of immigration  N,  we conjecture values for  the
aggregates  K  alr.d  U^, and solve the agents' decision problems.rs The agents' decision rules, in pa.rticula.r
their saviugs  decision  can be aggegated using the distribution  of initial  capital holdings, to snive at updated
va.lues  K'a.nd  yl  for aggregate  capital a.nd  median period-two fucome  The process  is then repeated using
the updated raluesl6 and terrninated when the changee  in K  and U^ from one iteration  to  the ueo<t  were
negligible. This procedure prol€d to be stable and to converge  rather quickly to equilibrium.  Thus, for each
possible  level of immigation  w€ obtain the resulting equilibrium  capital-Iabor ratios, factor prices, medians
and means of the  period-two income distribution  and period-tbree tax  rates.  As a consequence,  we can
associated  with  each  resident k a utility  function y  (N; k) Siving ft's lifetime utility  as a function of the level
of immigration.
One issue which of potential  importance itr our  quantitative  anallsis  is whether or  not  residents, in
period one, are allored  to borrow.  To understand why this may mattex, consider that  if  residents fare a
nonnegativity  constraint on savings in the fust  period, then the period-two income of erery resident is at
least as large as the income of an immigrant,  which is simply ru.  This  mea.ns  that  the median voter over
redistributive  policy in period twc-the  individual  with  the median level of period-tro  income-will  be a
resident for all levels of immigration  less than  100%  of the resident population.  On the other hand, when
resid€nts are allon'ed to borrolv in  period one, those who do so will  enter period two with  income net of
loalr repalments which is less than u,  placing them at the bottom  of the period-two hcome distribution.
Consequently, if  a positive fraction  of the resident population  borrows in period oue, the median voter in
period two will  be an immigrant for levels of immigration  less ihen  100%  of the residmt  population.
In  practice, howe.ler, a choice between one of these two environments has a signfficant impact on the
quantitatire  reSults  only when the fractions of residents  who either borrow or are constrained are implausibly
large-in  particular,  greater than one-half the initial  resident population.  This is true because  whether the
lower end of the period-two income distribution  consists  of, say, q period-one borrowers below N immigra.nts
or N immigrants below p constrained residents,  individuals at all but the rery bottoms of the two distributions
are roughly identical-in  fact, any one  of the p constrained  resident is, in terms of period-two income, identical
rsNote that t  is impli€d by a choic€  of i(,  given N,  since  t  :  Kd  (1 + Nl-'  / (1 + N).
16In some cases we employ  €' smoother  form  of updating,  setting  the  period-tv,o  capital  $tock  for  the  subsequent iteratior
equal to qK'  + (1 -  q) K,  q e (0, r), rarher tban J(,-
t7to an immiga.rrt.  If  the ftaction  of borrowers q is small, these individuals  will  not figure into the politicG
economic equilibrium  in period two, except insofar as their presence  may lower period-two average  income
from what  it  would be if no borrowiug were allowed. In particula.r, no citizen with  period-two income less
tha.n u, would ever be the median voter in period two.
If the frartion  of residents  who borrow is er<tremely  la.rge-large  enough that  the median voter in period
two is, for some  levels of immigration, a borrowerl7-then  the results can difier sigrrificantly across  the two
environments. Though we view this case  as highly implausible, it's  worth  exa.mining  inasmuch as it  senes
to illustrate  a key feature in the determination of the period-tbree ta:( rate.  Suppose  initially  we are in the
environmmt  in which residents are constrained not to borrow, so that  the resident with the smsllest income
in period two still  has income at least equal to ?rr,  which is the income of all immigrants.  Then, because  the
equilibrium  third-period  tax rate, ftom  (9), depeuds  only ou the ratio  of the mediaa period-two income to
arrrage period-two incoure, the period-three tax  rate is bounded above by I (1 -  o),  since for any lewl  of




Since d (z)  is deereasing  in  z,  we have e (g*/A)  S  I (l  -  c)  for  a.ll levels of immigratiou.  For standard
para.rneter  values, this ralue is arorurd 39%. When bouowing is permitted,  and the fraction of residents  who
borrow is la.rge  enough that for some  ler"els  of irnmigration the median voter is a borrow€r, the period-three
tax rate will be higher  than d (1 -  a).
In either case,  though, if the economy admits a large mough number of immigrants,  a.nd  if immigrarts
hare only labor to supply in period two, then the median level of period-two income will  either rise or fall
to ru, and rernain there even  as more iromigrarrts are added. Consequentlg the tax rate-whatever  its }evel
for small amounts of immigration-will  become  fixed at 0(1 -  a)  if enough immigrants are admitted in the
fust period.
5  Some  numerical  examples
Beceuse  of the complicated natrue of the typical  agent's objective function,  givm  by equations (10) and
(11), and constraints, described above, it  is difficult  to obtain  analytic  results concernilg  the equilibrium
lerel  of immigration  and taxation.  Instead, it  is instructi\€  to  consider a few mrmerical examples, which
a.re  presented below. The experiments below consider several alternative specifications of the envirorunent.
rTIf  g(N)  denotes the  fraction  of rcsidents  who  borrow,  then  the  case described  here arises if q (N)  >  ;  (I  +  N),  imPlyins  at
the  least that  g (N)  2  |,  so more than  half  the resident  population  must  be borrowingInitially  we look at distributions  with  two types of ag€nts, in which the population is everily split  between
tlro  levels of initial  wealth.  This example is useful in  highlighting  the role which hitial  wealth inequality
can play in  determining the majority-rule  level of immigration.  we  then consider the case of a uniform
distribution  of initial. wealth, focussing on the effect of .immigrants'.enftanchisement----or  ladt  thereof----on
residents' preferences  over alternative lercls of immigration.  Finally,  we et€rnine an envfuonment in which
residents' initial  wealth has an approrcimate lognormal distribution,  focussi:rg on both  the  consequences
changes  in the degree  of initial  wealth irequality  as well as the way in which the shape of the initial  wealth
distribution  impacts on tax policy and preferences  ol'er immigra.nts.
The primitircs  of the economies  examined below are the parameters a and P, and the initial  distribution
of residents' wealth'  In all the examples  that  follow $'e set f  =  r and a =  '30' and normalize the size of the
initial  resident population to unity-
5.1  Example  I
Consider an economy in  which half  the residents having initial  wealth of  10 units,  while  the  remaining
residents hare wealtb of 5 units.  It  is assumed  that  the level of immigration  can be any level between zero
and 120%  of the resident population.
The indirect utility  fuactions of the wealthier and poorer residents, as  firnctions of the lwel of immigration,
as well as the equilibrium  third-period  tax rate, axe shown in Figure 5. The units on the horizontal axis iu
al1  three panels of the figure are immigrants as a percent of the resident population.  For a moment, focus
on the range of zero to 100%,  putting  aside for now the sharp discontinuities which occur when the number
of immigrants e{ceeds  the size of the resident population-
In this exa.rnple,  the poorer residents a.re  made worse ofi by iacreased  immigration,  with  zero being the
preferred immigration  level for resideuts of this t]&e.  This comes about because  the new citizens have no
capital  and.  therefore merely iower the return  to labor.  The relatively  poor residents in  this  exa.rnple  rely
heavily on their labor income, relatirc  to their richer count€rparts. The rich citizens in contrast are in favor
of large levels  of immigration,  preferring a level of immigration  ofjust  up to 100%  of the resident population.
Since imrnigrants increase the supply of labor,  immigration  raises the  marginal  product  of capital,  and
therefore raises  the welfare of rich citizens, and this overwhelms the fact that  their labor hcome falls.
It  should be noted that,  in this dyuamic setting, in which residents male two non-trivial  corsumption-
savings decisions, it  is altogether possible--and  in  fact  the  case in  this  example--that  even as a poorer
resident's welfare is being reduced by immigration,  their  income from labor and savings combined may be
rising-  WeHare  falls nonetheless  as the poorer agents are forced to  make trade-offs which they would not
absent immigration.  In particular,  the savings  of poorer residenis-both  from period one to period two aud
then ftom period two to period three--rise  as the level of immigration  rises,  while their consumption in both
19the fust  and second  periods (not shown) declines. In  particular,  absent immigraiion,  with  a cousequently
higher return  to labor in the second  period, these residmts would not have had to save so Iarge a fraction
of their  initial  wealth endowment, and would have enjoyed higher first-period  consumption-  The rich, in
contrast, would sare a la.rge  fraction of their initial  endowment in any ev€nt, ard the higher return to savings
that  comes  with  an influx  of immigrants only enhances  their welfa.re.
The equilibrium  period-three tax  rater shown in  the  bottom  pauel of  Figure  5, is the  prefe.rred tax
rate of the individual with  the media.n  level of period two inmme, calcutated according to  (9).  For levels of
immigration between  zero and 100%  of the resident population, this median voter is a poorer resident.ls  Orer
this raaBe,  the tax rate is decreasing  in the level of immigration.  This is because  new inmigrants  represent a
'drain'  on the resources  of existing citizens. They do not generate as much income, but  nevertheless  receive
a transfer payment.ls Therefore, the more immigration  there is, the lower will  be the ta:c and trarsfer  level
that oristing  poor citizens will  choose-  In this case,  as the level of immigration  approaches  0.9, the tax and
tra.nsfer  lerel will  be zero.
Thi:rgs change  dramatically  once immigrants represent more than hall of the total  population in period
two. At this point, the median loter  over tax policy switches ftom being a poor resident to an (even poorer)
imrnigrant.  The level of period-two inmme which defines  the media.n  drops discontinuously from the inmme
of an individual  with  boih  labor income and income from savings, to someone  who has only labor income.
This much poorer median loter  consequently  prefers a much higher tax rate- Because  the period-two income
of an irnmigra.nt here is simply u,  for all levels of immigration  beyond 100%  of the residmt  population, the
tax rate in period three is e@tlg):  0(f  -  o), or rougbly 39%. The sharp  hcrease  in th€ tax rate-and,
consequently,  in  the redistributive  transfer payment-harms  both  types of initial  residents, the wealthier
morje  so, as one wor:ld expect.  This pattern  recu.rs  in  all of our subsequent  experiments; consequently we
will  focus below only on levels of immigration  between zero and 100P0  of the resident population.
While  preferences  of  the  r.r'ealthier residents are not  siugle.peaked, it  is nonetheless clear that  zero
immigation-preferred  over any other level by the poorer half of the population-is  a majority-rule  outcome.
The four panels of Figure  6 show the second period-capital  stock, wage rate and rctum  to  capital  as
functions of the level of inrmigration,  as well as the media.n  and average  levels of period-two income, the
ratio of which determines the period-three tax rate.  As one would expect, higher levels of irnmigration  are
associated  with  lorer  wages, a higher retu-rn to capital and a greater stock of capital.  Qualitatively,  this
pattern of behavior for the second-period  prices and qua.ntities recurs in all of our zubsequent  experimmts;
consequently,  in what follows we will focru primarily  on residents' indirect utilities  over the level of immigra-
tion as well as the behavior of the third-period  tax rate.  The fairly  constant decline in al€rage p€riod-two
rSAt  zero immigratio  a poorer  rcsident  is the  median  voter.
lsR€calt  Fom  the  deriwtion  of  an  agert's  preferred  tax  rate  (9) that  it  i6 not  simply  the  agert's  income  that  matters,  but
rather  th€  agent's  income  relative  to  average  income,  and  average  income  here  is  falling  as  immigranb  enter  th€  €conomy.
20income, shown as the dashed line in the bottom  panel, is also a typical  pattern  in  all of our e<periments
in which immigrants a.rrire with  only labor income- The increase  in  median period-two income (the solid
line)  over the rarge 0 to  10070,  @mes, as mentioned above, from the greater savings out  of initial  wealth
undertaken by poor residents  as immigrants both lower the.value of these  residmts'  period-two labor income
and raise the return to savings. At  ihe 100%  irnnigration  level, the ideniity  of the nedian period-two i:rcome
recipient switches from a poor citizen to an immi$anti  it  is this discontinuous drop which ceuses  the large
jump  in the period-three iax rete shown in Figure 5.
The fact that the return to capital is inoeasing in the level of inrmigration lends credence  to the argummt
that  immigration  is good for gms'th.  In a model in which there rere  many more periods one uight  imagine
how immigration, ty  i:nmediately raising the retrun to capital, would cause  investment to increase  for many
pedods- If there were constant aggregate  returns to cspitel,  this would fi.uther generate 8.n  increase  in the
$owth  rate.
This  case should be contrasted with  the case in which the poor agents have initial  wealth of I  units
instead of 5. This case  is illustrated in Figure 7. In ihis instance both the rich and poor agents  prefer a large
lerel of immigration.  The reasoning  is simple: since both rich and poor rely heavily on their capita.l  income
and are not too disparately affected by immigration,  their preferences  over alternative levels of immigration
are similar.  Figure 7 also shows that  the equilibrium  lewl  of the tax rate, as chosen  by the poorer citizens
when immigrants are less  tha.n 100%  of the size of the resident population, is also very low and equal to zero
for  imuigration  levels abole  12%. Again, there is a dramatic discontinuity  as the mr.mber  of immigra.nts
becomes  so large that  the prefermces of an immi$ant  dictates the third-period  fiscal policy.  As before,
both  types of residents suffer from this large ta). increase. Loosely speaking, this acarople illustrates why
one might  eccpect  to  observe an association bet$'€en wealth inequality  and the odstence of programs to
redisiribute  this wea.lth.
In this example, it is clear that immigration equal to just up to 100%  of residmt population is a majority-
rule outcome.m
Another featu-re  to note in this exarnple is that  as long as immigrants do not outmrmber residents, the
median voters in the fust and second  periods a.re  essentially the sarre agent-a  poor citizen. Therefore, there
is no need for the median voter in the first period to predict the behavior of anoiher future median voter in
the subsequent  period. This is not the case  in the next example.
5.2  Exarnple  2
Consider an economy  similar to that of the previous example except now assume  that the idtial  wealth lerel
is uniforurly  distributed  between 1 and 9, with  the initial  median voter havirg  a wealth level of 5 units.  In
2olf  we  assume that  when  the  numbe$  of  natives  and  immigrants  are equal,  a native's  preferenc€s  are  decisive,  then  the
utilities  shown  in the  Figure  would  be  upper-semicontinuous,  with  maxima  at  100.this case, the median voter in period one must calculate how his choice of immi$ation  will  influence the
behavior of the succeeding  md.ian voter in the subsequent  period, who will  be choosing  the equilibrium  tax
rate.  At  zero immigration,  the median period-two income recipient is the resident with  the media.n  initial
level wealth; for all other levels  of immigratiorg though, the median period-two inmme recipient is a resident
further dovrn in the hitial  wealth distribution.
Figure 8 shows  the utilities  of the wealthiest, media.n  and poorest residents, as a firnction of the level of
irnmigrstion.  Again, it  must be recalled that  this is the expected sicounted utility  from period one onward.
Tbe bottom panel also shows  the equilibrium period-three tax rate as a function of the lwel  of immigration.
As more (poor) immigrants are admitted into the economy,  the median voter iu period two becoues poorer,
and therefore becomes  more iuclined to chooee  a higher tax rate, and therefore a higber level of tra.nsfers.  For
immigration lerrels  above  80%, the tax rate is r.mchanged  at 39%. The reason  is that for levels  of immigration
abore this quantity, the median voter in period two becomes  someone  an individual  with  only labor income,
and therefore is someone  identical to a new immigrant.2r  As discussed  iu  the preceding section, once the
level of immigration rises to the poiut where median period-two income is equal to the wage  rate ?u,  th€n the
ratio of median to a!€rage income is simply labor's share of income, which is 1 -  a given our Cobb-Douglas
specificatioa of production.  Adding rrore irnmigrants beyond this critical  ralue does not change  anything.
While the utility  of the wealthiest resident is decidedly not single-peaked,  nor even is the utility  of the
median resident, nooetheless  at least half of the resident population,  from the median initial  wealth-holder
on down, does not  wish to have any immi$ation.  In  this  case, the median resldent's preference  for zero
immigration ow€s  primarily  to the rise in the tax rate that  r€sults in period two, while the poorest resident's
preference  for zero immigratior  owes  primarily  to the depressing  efiect which immigrants have on the return
to labor.  This can be seen  very clea,rly  iu example 3 belon', in which immigrants are disen-frandrised  in the
second-period,  resulting in a zero tax rate oa€r almost the entire ra.nge  of immigratior  from zero to 100%.
The preferences  over immigration lerels of the rnediau resident are completely reversed  by this change,  while
the poorest resident continues to prefer a zero level of immigration.
One night  be tempted to think  that  much of the behavior in this exanple stems from the fact that  the
immiga  ts have no capital, and the results would be reversed  if they were relatively  rich-i.e.,  the median
voter would then prefer more immigration.  In  fact,  only some of this  statement is true.  Figure 9 shows
the results for the case  in which immigrants have 9 units  of capital,  rather  than  zero, as in the economy
of Figure 8-  In this sense,  immigrants are as rich as as the richest citizens.  RicI  residents now prefer no
immigration  while poor residents now prefer the maximum  level.  These effects are present because  the
investment generated  by the immigrants will  raise the wage of workers while lowering the marginal product
2r'fhat  is,  in  this  example  a small  fraction  of  residents-around  10% of  the  resident  population-are  constrain€d  in  their
tust-Period  savings decisioD, choosing s =  0.  Such individuals  enter  pedod  two  with  only  labor  inc.ome.
22of capiial.
The tax  rate chosen  by the mdeian period-two voter is also shown, a.nd it  is positive for  small levels
of immigration,  but  then rapidly  falls to zero- The reason for  iNs  is tha  as this immigration  of the rich
increases,  the median..voter eventually becomes  richer than the.mean.  and this median \oter  then wsnts a
?€ro  tax rete.
The median resident iq this case prefers zero immigration-just  as in  Figure 8.  The reason for this is
that altho,rgh this iudividual  benefits from the increase  in the marginal product of labor, and the fall in the
tax rate, this is outweighed by the fall ir  the return  to capital.
5.3  Example  3
Let us return to the case  in whidr immigrants have zero capital.  The results differ dramatically, as compared
to the economy  shom, in Figure 8, if immigrants are not franchised to vote over fiscal policy in the second
period. To see  this consider an economy  identical to the one just described  but suppose  that immigrarts  axe
never given the right to vote. Consequently,  the median voter is the same  individual in periods one and two.
Figure 10 shows the same iuformation  coneyed  in  Figure 8 for this case. In  contrast with  the previ
ous results, the tax rate is now decreasing  in  the level of iruni$ation,  a.nd  is very quickly-at  a level of
immigration  somewhere  around 4% of the residmt  population-*equal  to zero. The rea.son  for this is that,
with  immigrants disenfranchised,  the median voter who decides  on the third-period  tax rate is unchanging,
and is simply the  initial  median resident.  The period-two  income of this  resident rises with  the  level of
immigration, as immigration  raises the return to saving. Meanwhile, as ir  the previous e>carnples,  immigra-
tion drives dowrr the average  level of period-two income. Eventually-around  4% imnigration-the  media.n
voter's period-two income is higher tha.n average  period-two income, so that  this resident prefers a zero tax
rate and zero transfer-z  Figure 11 shows average  period-two income, median period-two income and the
income of the mediau resident as a function of the level of immigration.
The message  to be gleaned from these examples  is that  if immigrants a.re  relatir.ely poor, then ganting
them voting rights may result in  relatively  high taxes.  Flom  the perspective of a wealthy resident, immi-
gration is good because  it  raises the return  to capital.  However, this benefit is tempered by the fact that
immi$ants  are able to r,'ote  in the future-  These residents would then be in favor of a prolonged period of
residency  for new immigrants before they eaxned  the right  to vote,
22In faEt, this  small  segment  with  A >  0, from  N  =  0 to  N:4%,  is due to  the savings constraint  (s >  O) which  \r'e impoaed
in  the  computations  of  thi-s cs.se. For  reidents  who  do  save, savings  is linear  in  initial  wealth.  lf  all  residents  had  positive
Eavings  in  the  first-period,  then  avemge  pedod  two  income  at  zero  immigration  would  be  the  income  of  the  average  initial
v,Ealth-holder-who  is also the  median  initial  wealth-holder,  given  the  uniform  distributior  of initial  wealth.  If some residents
do  not  save-and  here,  a small  fraation  do  not-then  average  p€riod-two  ircome  at  zero  immi$ation  will  be  higher  than  the
income  of the  average initial  w€alth-holder,  ll'ho  G also the  median  period-two  voter  when  immigrsnts  ar€ not  given  the  right5.4  Exarnple 4
In  this  exanple,  we assume that  residmts'  initial  wealth  consists of  a minimum  ler'el of wealth which
is identical for all residents plus a component which is distributed  across residents lognormally.  In  all of
follcmring  the orperiments, the minimum wealth component  is set at five units arid the mean of the lognormal
component is set at 10 uniis.
We iniiially  consider the case  of an econorny  with  a fairly  low lerel of inequality, setting the remaining
ftee pararneter of the distribution23 so that  the lognormally distributed  component of initial  wealth has a
Gini  coefficient of appro<imately 0.25.  Figure 12 plots the tax  rate in  period three as a function  of the
nunber  of immigrants. The tax rate initially  falls, then rises-at  immigration  equal to 100%  of the resid€nt
population it necessa.rily  equals 0 (f  -  a), and if the graph were octended to the right, the tax rate would be
constant at this ra.lue. The explanation for this pattern in the tax rate lies at least pa.rtially in the nature
of the lognormal distribution,  a point  vr€ will  return  to  momentarily.  For now, however, re  turn  to  the
rcsulting indirect utilities  of residents over the level of tnmigation.
In  this case, as one car  see ftom  Figure  13, residmts have well-behaved, single.pea.k  preferences  over
the level of immigration,  with  fwo of the tbree t]?€s  of residmt  shown having preferued  pohts  which are
hterior  to the range of immigration  from 0 to 100%  of the resident population.  The peaks  are also monotone
in  the resident's lerel of initial  wealth, with  the poorest resident prefening  zero immigration,  the medisn
resident preferring immigration  equal to roughly 88% of the resident population, and the wealthy residentu
preferring immigration just over 89% of the resident population.  It is interesting to note, though not entirely
unexpected, that  the median resident's peak does not minimize the period-three tax rate; the tax rate at
the median resident's preferred level of immigration is approrcimately  5%.
ff  we apply  the  median voter  theorem in  this  instarce-which  is applicable given the  single-pea&ed
preferences-the  majority-rule  equilibrirun level of immigration will  be near 88% of the resident population,
with a resulting  tax rate in the third period whidr is near  5%.
We now consider a.n  increase in the degree  of initial  wealth inequality, keeping other paxameters,  such
as the meau and minimum  wealth level, ffxed. In pariicular,  suppose  that  the Gini coefficient of inequality
for the lognormal  component  of resident's  wealth  is y6'tghly  0.75  rether than 0.25.  Figure 14  shows  the ta>c
rate on savings income in  the third  period, which is now increasing over the whole rarlge of immi$ation
levels, and is also uniformly  quite higher than in the low-inequality setting. The higher level of the tax rate
that  now obtains is not  surprising given that  the tax rate is a decreasing  function  of the ratio  of median
23Precisely,  a typical resident's  initiat wealth takes the form i-;.  +X,  where los(X)  -N(p,"2).  The Gini coefficient  for
X  depends  only on or  (see  Lambert [s], p-45) while the mean of X  is exp [p +  (az7Z)].  Ci".n  a yalue for Gini, hence  a a2,
we set p to give a mean of 10. Note that the median ralue ofX  is exp(p).
2aThe 'wealthy' resident is d€6ned ss the resident whose realth  level is the cut-of  for the top  1% of the initial  wealth
distribtution.
24period-two income to average  period-two income, and so is, in a sense,  increasing in the degree  of income
inequality  in  period two.  The greater degree  of initial  wealth inequality  in this  example translates into a
greater degree  of income inequality  in  the second period, thus leadirg  to  a higher tax  rate at all levels of
immigration.
Utfities  over immigration  are showa in  Figure  15.  While  the  wealthy  residmt  continues to  hal€  a
preferred immigration  level which is interior-though  somewhat  higher-both  the median and poor residents
now prefer zero immi$ation.  In pa.rt, this is due to the fact that  greater initial  wealth inequality translates
into a lower lerel of median initia.l wealth-the  mediau resident is now an i:rdividual  who starts off poorer
than in the lon' inequality case. Conversely,  the 'wealthy' individual  whme utility  is shov.n in the figure-
the individual  whose wealth holding defines the top  l%  of the initial  wealth distribution-is  now a much
wealthier individual  than the correeponrling hdividual  in Figure 13.25
IIow  ca.n  we eccplfi  the particular  shapes which the equilibrium  level of taration  bas in  the two €x-
pedments?  Consider the low inequality  case fust,  where the equilibrium  tax rate was initially  decreasing
then increasing in the level of immigration.  With  the low lerel of inequality  considered  in this example, the
median of the initial  wealth distribution  is slightly  to the right of the mode. Figure 16 plots portions of the
initial  wealth distributiou  for both the low and high inequality cases,  with  circles identifying  the medians.
At zero immigration,  the media.u  lwel  of initial  wealth also identifies the media.n  voter over the third-period
tax policy-since  savings ale monotouic in initial  wealth, the median initial  wealth-holder has the median
relue of period-two income absent a.ny  immigratiou-  Imagine for a moment that  the pool of potmtial  im-
migrants is not  a continuum; rather  suppose  that  imuigra,nts come in  multiples  of some constant, small
unit  of rnass----call  it  A  for concreteness.  Since immigrants arrive at the bottom  of the period-two income
distribution,  for each 'urrit'  of immigration  whicli  the €conomy admits,  the level of wealth which defines
the median p€dod-two aoter moves leftward-i.  e., downward in the initial  wealth distribution-in  discrete,
though non-consta"ut,  steps-  Thus, each successive  mass A  of entrants mows  the identity  of the median
period-two voter, il  terms of initial  wealth, downwa.rd,  and the size of these'st€ps'  must be such that  the
mass  over each is equal to A.
On the right side of the mode, the requisite 'step'size' adjustment in the identity of the period-two media,n
voter actually shrinks as each discrete mass immigrants arrives, since the height of the densiiy is rising as
we move downward in the distribution---each A  units of mass correspond to successively  smaller step6. For
each constant unit  of immigration  which arrives, the wealth level identifuing  the median period-two voter
necessarily  falls, but  at a decreasing  rate-  To the left of the mode, on the other hand, the step sizes  must
increases  as each successire  mass of immigra.nts arriles,  since the height of ihe density is now falling  as
2EIn moving  from  the  low inequality  to  the  high  inequatity  case, the  m€dian  initial  \r,ealth level falls  from  about  14 units  to
11 units;  the  l€vel of wealth  defining  the  top  1% ol the  initial  weatth  distribution  rises from  about  31 units  to  about  64 units.
25ll€ move downward in the distribution.  Consequently, for each constant unit  of immigration  which arrires,
the wealth level identifying the median period-two voter must fall at an increasing rate.  If these effects are
large relative to other general  equilibrium  efiects in the model, we can expect the median level of period-two
income to fall at fust slowly as the level of irnnigation  is increased,  then more rapidly, as the level of initial
wealth identifying the median period-two vote drops sharply. This is precisely what happens  in our example,
as sho.pvn  in the top panel of Figure 17.
,Aoeroge  period-two income, on the other hand, shor:Jd  be more robust to each  successive  unit of immigration-
in fact,  in  the  examples here, as ir  the previous ones, it  falls at  a roughly  constarxt rate as the level of
immigration  rises, as both  panels of Figure  17 show.  As a consequence,  in  the low inequality  case, the
ratio  of median period-two income to  average period-two  income initially  rises thm  falls-resulting  in  a
third-period  tax rate which iniiially  falls than rises. That  is, the income of the median period-two voter is
initiaily-at  zero immigration-below  average  and hence this individual  prefers a positive tar<  rate.  As the
level of immigration increases,  the median period-two voter becorues  more like the average  period-two income
recipient, and so favors smaller taxes and transfers. Finally-as  the level of immigrants pushes  the median
period-two voter dov'n the left side of the mode of the initial  wealth distribution-the  media.n  period-two
voters axe  residents  whose iucomes  are falling rapidly  below averagel  mnsequently, they are individuals who
prefer increasingly high taxes and transfers-
When the ler"el  of initial  wealth inequality is high, the median of the iniiial  wealth distribution  is farther
to the dght of the mode, which is now much nea,rer  the minimum lercl of initial  wealth.  [See  again Figure 16]
As a result, the range and associated  mass  over which the wealth level identifying median period-two voter
falls precipitously as immigrants axril€-as  we come do''n'n  the density on the left side of the mode-is  much
smaller than in the low inequality case-  The mass  between  the median and the mode is much larger than that
between  the mode and the minimum wealth level, the opposite of the low inequality case.26  Consequently,
the gap betv,,een  median and arerage period-two income grows rapidly only at a high level of immigration.
Up to that  point, as the bottom panel of Figure 17 shows,  median period-two income falls fairly  constantly,
though somewhat more rapidly  than period-two average  income. Thus, the third-period  tax rate gradually
rises over most of the range of immigration  from zero to 100%,  increasing rapidly only as immigration  nears
100%  of the resident population.
6  Conclusions
The  economies studied  here a.re, of course,  necessarily  highly  stylized  so that  one can study  all  the  compli-
cated  forces at  play.  The  fact  that  tax  ard  immigration  policies  are determined  endogenously  implies  that
26Roughly  177o of the  mass is to  the  left  of tbe  mode  in  the  high  inequality  cas€, versus roughly  33% in  the  low  inequality
26agents must  examine  all  of these complicated  interactions  when  expressing  their  preferences over the  desired
immigration  and fiscal  policies.  Nevertheless,  the  model  does give some insights  as to  what  factors  lead to  a
higher preference  for increased immigration.
The results  that  appear  to  be forthcoming  from  this  model  ca.n be.emrmeraied  as follows.  First,  the  more
farsighied  axe agents-i.e.,  the  higher  is the  discount  factor*the  more  they  will  prefer  higher  immigration.
This  is because the  iacreased labor  force will  raise the  return  to  capital,  which  is important  if  agents strongly
care about  future  consumption.
Second, for  similar  reasors,  the  higher  is capital's  share of  income,  the  greater  will  be the  desired  level
of im:nigration.
Thirdly  the  higher  is  the  level  of  initial  wealth  equality,  as measured  by  the  ratio  of  uean  wea.lth  to
median  wealth,  the  greater  will  be  the  desired  level  of  immigration.  There  is some looae support  for  this
prediction.  Most  measures of qealth  or income  show there  is more  inequality  in  the  US than  in  Canada  or
Australia,  ard  these latter  cowrtries  have higher  rates  of  immigration  than  does the  former.
Fourth,  if  immigrants  are relatively  poor  and  quickly  receive  the  franchise  to  vote  ov€r the  allocation  of
resources, then  increased immigraiion  is likely  to  lead to  higher  futule  taxes  and  trar$fers.
Fifth,  some subtle  changes in  the  distribuiion  of initial  wealth  can lead  to  drastic  changes in  the  level of
desired  immigration-  The  initial  media.n voter  mr-rst weigh  the  benefits  provided  by  increased  immigration
(i.e.,  a higher  margiaal  product  of  capital)  with  the  costs  (i.e.,  lover  v/age rates,  higher  future  taxes  and
transfers).  Perhaps the  most  importart  of these costs is to  consider  exactly  which  policies  the  future  median
voters  may  select.  If  the  introduction  of  5% more  workers  is like\  to  drastically  change the  wealth  level  of
the subsequent median  voter,  and therefore  radically  change the  subs€quent policies  that  will  be chosen, then
the  desired lei.el of irnmigration  chosen by the initial  median  voter  may  not  be rery  high.  Although  many  of
the  axguments  against  increased  immigration  in  European  countries  are often  couched  in  terrns  of cultural
impact,  it  would  appear  that  this  is really  economically  indistinguishable  (or  observationally  equivelent)  to
a  "fear"  of what  sorts  of policies  these inmigrants  will  favor  in  the  future  if  they  are given  the  right  to  vote
and thereby determine policies.
Ma.ny of  the  experiments  we conducted  had  the  premise  that  immiga.nts  were relatively  poor.  This  is
not  an  uueasonable  assumption  since this  is exactly  hat  is witnessed  in  imrnigration  patterns  around  the
world.  If  these immigrants  v/ere insiead  relatively  ridr,  then  it  is easy to  se€ why  existing  rich  agents would
not  want  as much  immigration,  since it  would  lower  the  return  to  existing  capital.  Simila"rly,  poorer  agents
mighi  wish  to  have more  immigration  since it  would  raise the  wage to  labor,  and  provide  a higher  tax  base
for redistributi',€  fiscal policies.
277  Appendix:  the  first-order  condition  for  an agent's  preferred  tax  rate
Let z = y  fg. Up to a constant,  the  objectire  is  given  by
(1  +pJros[(1  +BJz+eAG-,)]  -(1  +B)]oc(1  +F-0F)+Etoe1-q.
The first-order condition is then
0o+  F)0  - z)  P0+  P)  P
(1+il2+0FG-z)  7+B-0F  r-0
OI
or,,o,f  1-'  -  1  l:  B
^,  \r  -ri,,/ 
LFI p1=e0(j  r 1  +  p  _ 0Bl 
- 
t _ 0.
Consider the bracketed expression on ttre leffhand  side.  Combining the two fractions inside the brackets
gires a fraction the denominator of which is
I0  + 0\  z  +  0F  0 - z)l  (1  +  P  - 0  il : l( +  B  - e  fl z  +  0  Bl  0 +  B  - 0  B)
= (7  +  B  - 0g)z  z  + oP  (L  +  B  - eil.
while  the  numerator  is
(t - z)  (r  + F  - 0  F)  + I  + il z  + 0  B  (1  - z)  : (t - z)  (1  + B  - 0  A)  + $ + P  - 0  P)  z  + e  P
:r +  B  - op  - zQ  +  a  - e0)  +  0 +  a  - 0F)  z  +  e0
:1+ p.
We thus obtain
B(1  +6)  -r+B  :-E-. 'Yr 
Q+P-e8 z+eBi+P-oh  |  -e'
or
G  +  n2  $ - e)  : Q  +  p  - o$2  z  + eB$  +  0  - efi  .
Expanding  out  the  terns  on the  right-hand  side gives
G  + P)2  z  - 2(r  + 0)  020  + 92  202  + (r  + l, Pe  - P202,
OI
(t  +  B)2  z+B(1  +B)  (1  - 22)0  - B2  (7  - z)02.
Collecting  these  together  with terms on the left  (1+ 02  -  (1 + B)2  P-gro€s
B2O ,0'-  l(1  rB)2+B(  r0)(1  -24f4+(t+6)2(I  -z)-0.
28The coefficient on the term in 0 can be further simplified to
_(1+B)tr+B+po_urrl_rrtrluurrrrrrllior!"),
Substituting  back z :  U  lA, w  a"rrire  at the form stated  in the tsxt above:
o  ('-t)02  -  (t+  p) 
l'*'o  ('  -  -z)]  e+  tr  +o)'('  - g)  : '.
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Residents' utilities  over immigration  in the two-period model, various ratios of
initial  wealth to averaEe  initial  wealth.
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Utility  of resident with  average  initial  wealth holding in the two-period model with
direct immigration  costs,  larious ralues  of B- The solid  line is B:  1.0,  the dashed
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Utility  of resident with  average  initial  wealth holding in the two-period model with
dfueci immigraiion  costs, various values  of a.  The solid line is a =  .30, the dashed
lineisa:.35.
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Figure  6
Capital stock, prices and period-two incomes for the economy with  two types of
residents-k € {5, f0}, with equal  numbers  of each  type.
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Figure  7
Results for the economy  with  two types of residents-,t  € {9' l0}'  with  equal
nunbers of each type.
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Results for the economy  with  a uniform distribution  of iniiial  wealth'
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Figure  9
Results for the economy  with  a uniform distribution  of initial  wealth; immigrants
arrive with  capital equal to that of the wealthiest resident.
Utiliity  of  wealthiest  resident
Utility  of  median  resident
20  30  40  50  60  70  80
lmmigration  as  a percent  of resident  population
100 90 80 70 OU 50 40 30 20 10 0





Utility  of  poorest  resident
Period-three  tax  rate
385.5
Figure  10
Results for the economy  with  a uniform distribution  of initial  wealth; immigrants
are not permitted to vote itr period two.
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Incomes  in pedod two ftom the economy  with a u:riform  distribution of initial
wealth;  immigrants  are not permitted to vote in period two.
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Equilibrium  period-three tax rate in the economy  with  an approximate logrrormal
distribution of initial wealth-low  inequality  case.
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Residents' utilities  over im.rnigration  in the economy with  an approximate
lognormal distribution  of initial  wealth-low  inequality case.
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Figure 14
Equilibrium period-three  ta:( rate in the economy  with an approdmate  lognormal
distribution of iniiial wealth-high  inequaliiy case.
Periodthree  tax  rate
0  '10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100





Residents'  utilities  over immigration  in the economy  with  an approximate
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